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Treatment for Federal Income Tax Purposes of Other Taxes Deducted
But Later Refunded or Liability for Which Is Cancelled
The problem discussed in this note arises in the following fact situation:
a taxpayer pays or accrues a tax, and deducts the amount thereof in com-
puting his net income taxable by the Federal Government; then for some
cause the tax deducted is refunded, or accrued liability for it is cancelled.
The causes of refund of deducted taxes or cancellation of liability for them
seem divisible into three categories: (i) where the original levy was
illegal; due to later declared unconstitutionality of the taxing statute, mis-
application of it, or overvaluation of property taxable under it; (2) where the
original levy was legal but ultimate liability was later reduced due to com-
promise, or retroactive statute; (3) where, by his own action, the taxpayer
erroneously overpays the tax. As the cause varies, the method of treatment
of the refund or discharged liability may involve consideration of different
factors. But the problem always is: I shall the income tax return of the
year of deduction be amended to exclude or reduce the deduction, or shall
the return of the year of the refund or cancellation of accrued liability
include as income the amount of the refund or cancelled liability? For
sake of convenience we shall refer to the first method as retroactive correc-
tion, and the second method as subsequent adjustment.
2
I. PRIVILEGE TO DEDUCT AND DUTY TO INCLUDE AS INCOME
The problem is not, however, submitted to the Board of Tax Appeals
or to the courts as a choice of alternatives, but rather is the legal issue:
either, did the taxpayer have a privilege under the Revenue Act to deduct
the tax; or, was he under a duty to include a certain amount in later
income?
A. Privilege to Deduct
Section 23 (c) of the Federal Revenue Acts 8 provides:
"§ 23. Deduction from gross income. In computing net income,
there shall be allowed as deductions:
(c) Taxes generally. Taxes paid or accrued within the taxable
year, except . .
Section 48 (c) I provides that the terms "paid or accrued" shall be con-
strued
"... according to the method of accounting upon the basis of which
the net income is computed . . ."
It would seem then that a taxpayer on the cash basis would of right be
entitled to deduction of amounts paid as taxes. But the privilege of tax
i. What taxes are deductible changes with the Revenue Acts. The principles
and problems here discussed are applicable to all deductible taxes.
2. In Brown, The Treatment for Federal Income Tax Purposes of Errors in the
Deduction.of Other Taxes (1937) 85 U. OF PA. L. REv. 385, the methods are termed
"theoretical" and "practical" respectively.
3. INT. REV. CODE §23 (c) -(1939), 26 U. S. C. A. §23 (c) (1940).
4. INT. REv. CODE §48 (c) (939), 26 U. S. C. A. §48 (c) (I94O) ; Westerfield
v. Rafferty, 4 F. (2d) 590 (E. D. N. Y. 1925) ; Bennett Properties Co., 45 B. T. A.
No. 112, November 13, 1941.
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deduction "is based on liability therefor." " "Paid or accrued" bears this
limitation, and therefore does not give a right of deduction to a volunteer.8
Thus as to the first category, the problem arises whether an invalid
statute, regulation, or assessment imposed liability upon the taxpayer before
it was judicially declared invalid. An unconstitutional statute was early
declared to be "void ab initio"; 7 and any taxes paid or accrued pursuant
thereto were improperly deducted, and the deduction had to be retroactively
eliminated.8 Admittedly, both "accrued" and paid are subject to the inter-
pretation resulting by adding the words "ultimately lawfully." '
But the law now generally recognizes the practical compulsion exerted
by such a statute, and Justice Hughes described the statute's existence as
an "operative fact." 10 Thus the Board sustained the deduction where the
practical compulsion was evidenced by actual payments of the taxes. 1 In
J. A. Dougherty Sons, Inc., however, accruals of resisted taxes were dis-
tinguished, and the deduction disallowed.12
Propriety of accrual seems acceptedly governed by the test of United
States v. Anderson: ". . . all the events [must] occur which fix the
amount of the tax and determine the liability of the taxpayer to pay it." 13
Accrual of contingent liabilities is thus improper,14 but lack of declaration
of validity is obviously not a contingency within this rule. Litigation is
said to have no effect upon the duty to accrue; 15 nor should it on the priv-
ilege. In legal liability there can be no distinction on the basis of payment
as against accrual 1'-the statute fixes the liability, not the taxpayer's
promptness in payment or his accounting method. Moreover, § 23 (c)
indicates that no distinction is to be observed for purposes of deduction.
5. 3 PAUL AND MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION (1934) 182.
6. Id. at §25.07; 411 C. C. H. 1941 Fed. Tax Serv. ff 181.13.
7. Chicago, Indianapolis & Louisville Ry. v. Hackett, 228 U. S. 559, 566 (1913);
Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U. S. 425, 442 (1886) (neither case involved tax prob-
lems).
8. Joseph V. Horn, 23 B. T. A. 1131 (93); Phillip C. Brown, io B. T. A. 1122
(1928) ; I. T. 2578, X-i Cum. BULL. 119 (I93I) (it was conceded here, however, that
subsequent adjustment would be easier); 0. D. 741, 3 Cum. BUL.. 115 (1920); I
MONTGOmERY, FEDERAL TAX HANDBOOK (1940) 480; 3 PAUL AND MERTENS, op. Cit.
stpra note 5, § 25.05.
9. The argument that such an exaction is not a "tax" within the usual definition
because it is not ultimately enforceable appears never to have been adverted to.
io. Chicot County Drainage District v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U. S. 371, 374
(1940), quoted in: J. A. Dougherty Sons, Inc., v. Com'r, 121 F. (2d) 7oo (C. C. A.
3d, 1941) and Phipps v. School Dist. of Pittsburgh, III F. (2d) 393, 395 (C. C.
A. 3d, I94O).
ii. Central Loan & Investment Co., 39 B. T. A. 981 (1939); Chas. W. Nash, 34
B. T. A. 675 (1936), aff'd, 88 F. (2d) 477 (C. C. A. 7th, 1937), cert. denied, 301
U. S. 700 (937) ; Chevy Chase Land Co., 34 B. T. A. 15o (1936). As to recovery
of such taxes, see FIELD, EFFECT OF AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL STATUTE (935) 241
et seq.; Field, The Recovery of Illegat and Unconstitutional Taxes (1932) 45 HARv.
L. Rav. 5Ol.
12. 42 B. T. A. 892 (194o), revd, 121 F. (2d) 700 (C. C. A. 3d, 1941).
13. 269 U. S. 422, 441 (1926). See United States v. Mitchell, 271 U. S. 9 (1926),
and 3 PAUL AND MERTENS, op. cit. supra note 5, § 25-31.
14. 411 C. C. H. 1941 Fed. Tax Serv. 14o9.o. Cf. L. 0. io86, I Cum. BuLL. 87
(1922). Accrual was held improper where there was "reasonable certainty" that the
liability would not be enforced. Hurd Millwork Corp., 44 B. T. A. No. 126, June
24, 1941.
15. Com'r v. Central United Nat'l Bank, 33 B. T. A. 588 (935), aff'd, 99 F.
(2d) 568 (C. C. A. 6th, 1938) ; I MONTGOMERY, op. cit. supra note 8, at 478; 3 PAUL
AND MERTENS, Op. cit. supra note 5, § 25.48. But cf. Lepman Bros. Co., 45 B. T. A.
No. 126, November 21, 194i; Smith Packing Co., 42 B. T. A. 1054 (1940).
16. J. A. Dougherty Sons, Inc., 121 F. (2d) 700 (C. C. A. 3d, 1941). Cf. Car-
tex Mills, Inc., 42 B. T. A. 894 (194o) ; Elsie S. Eckstein, 41 B. T. A. 746 (194o).
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Thus, in June, 1941, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the
Board in the Dougherty case, concluded that an unconstitutional statute
imposed, before adjudication, a liability sufficiently definite and certain that
accrual of it brought it within the terms of § 23 (c) and allowed the deduc-
tion.17  Though the Board of Tax Appeals has attempted a distinction,",
the same conclusions seem valid where a statute is misapplied, or taxes
levied on the basis of an overvaluation. That the last two errors occur
more often would hardly seem to decrease the taxpayer's liability. A guess
as to invalidity is just as much a guess.
Professor Robert C. Brown well insists that the ability of taxpayers or
their counsel to predict the ultimate rulings of Treasury attorneys, the
Board of Tax Appeals, or the courts on complex tax problems is not so
great as to relieve them of the realistic compulsion of statutes, regulations,
or assessments. 19 Moreover, it seems yet to be true that accrual and
deduction must be taken when proper, and failure to do so not only does
not allow it in a later year, but will, on running of the statute of limitations,
preclude any deduction at all.20 With liability in this category accepted, the
privilege to deduct seemed assured by the statute, and retroactive correction
thereby discarded.
The Board's majority opinion in E. B. Elliott Co.,2 ' however, admits
"provisional" liability and propriety of payment or accrual under invalid
statutes or regulations or assessments, but requires retroactive correction
on the theory that final determination of the tax liability for any year must
be on the basis of deductions only of ultimate tax liabilities for the taxable
year. It must be noted, however, that § 23 (c) provides for deduction of
"accruals [proper] within the taxable year."
In the second category, where compromises, or retroactive statutes are
the cause of a reduQtion in amounts of taxes deducted, the original levy is
legal and clearly imposes liability in the first instance.22 Payment or accrual
according to the provisions of the statute or assessment is valid, and the
deduction may not be disallowed on the theory, as in cases of unconstitu-
tional or misapplied statutes, that the original deduction was a mistake and
it must be corrected. Thus, subsequent adjustment has repeatedly been
held correct in these cases.28 However, on the authority of the Elliott Co.
opinion, retroactive correction was required on the startling theory that
all exactions and charges are only "provisionally valid," and only ultimate
tax liability for the taxable year should ultimately be deducted.2 4
In the third category, where the overdeduction is caused by an
excessive self assessment of taxes, there seems no answer to the argument
17. Ibid.
I8. Dixie Pine Products Co., 45 B. T. A. No. 50, October 7, I941, 9o U. OF PA.
L. REv. 367. Twice before the Board had expressly denied the validity of any such
distinction-Dixie Margarine Co., 38 B. T. A. 471, 475 (1938) ; Guitar Trust Estate,
34 B. T. A. 857, 874 (1936). Also, i MONTGommy, op. cit. supra note 8, 480:
".. . it makes little difference whether the recovery . . . is allowed because the
tax has been held unconstitutional, or because it was otherwise improperly assessed."
19. See Brown, note 2 supra, at 387, 400. United States v. S. S. White Dental
Manufacturing Co., 274 U. S. 398, 403 (1927) : "The Taxing Act does not require
the taxpayer to be an incorrigible optimist."
20. See i Mo xraommy, op. cit. supra note 8, at 482, and Brown, note 2 supra,
at 392 et seq.
21. 45 B. T. A. 82 (1941). Compare the theory in J. I. Case Co. v. United
States, 32 F. 'Supp. 754 (Ct. Cl., 1940).
22. Com'r v. Central United Natl Bank, 99 F. (2d) 568 (C. C. A. 6th, 1938),
aff'g, 33 B. T. A. 588 (935).
23. See II, B of this note.
24. Budd International Corp., 45 B. T. A. No. 119, November ig, 1941.
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that no such liability was imposed and the taxpayer merely made a mistake.
Accordingly, it is held that the mistake must be corrected retroactively.25
Thus, on legal theory the "ultimate-liability" view might deny a deduc-
tion as of right in all instances. "Liability in the first instance" would be
found "within the taxable year" in the first two categories-though the
deduction is not always correspondingly sustained. But deduction in the
third class cannot be based on liability for the tax amount deducted.
B. Duty to Include as Income
A cash refund is income .2 Cancellation of liability produces income.
But it seems settled in all these cases, and fairly so, that the amount must
be included in the year received, or cancelled, only if the deduction was
taken before, and is allowed to remain.2 7  Inclusion in income is then
required on the ground that the amount is income and that otherwise a
portion of the taxpayer's income will totally escape taxation. 28 There is
indication, however, stemming from the Supreme Court's decision in Burnet
v. Sanford & Brooks Co., 2 9 that "each year shall be treated on its merits" 30
and this requires inclusion of such amounts in income without reference to
prior action. Adoption of such a rule must carry with it, to be fair and
avoid double taxation of the same income, adoption of a rule to allow the
earlier deduction to remain, which would necessitate a disregard of whether
there was any liability for the amount deducted. If inclusion of the amount
in income is adjudged proper, to what extent it must be so included will be
considered under The Benefit Problem.
Thus the duty to include in income is yet dependent upon the privilege
to deduct, and the ultimate legal problem is whether such a privilege exists.
II. THE STATE OF THE LAW
"Taxation is a practical matter." 81 It is largely true in the cases
under consideration that the legal issue is solved by application of a legal
principle formulated with an eye toward the hardship and practical diffi-
culties which application of any other principle would entail. Retroactive
correction will in theory produce the exact tax liability (as to both income
tax and the deductible tax) to which the taxpayer would have been subject
had there been no "error." This is a desirable goal-seemingly fair to
25. Leach v. Com'r, 5o F. (2d) 371 (C. C. A. Ist, I93I), aff'g, I6 B. T. A.
781 (1929). But cf. Walter M. Marston and Elizabeth C. Marston, 41 B. T. A. 847
(094o).
26. U. S. Treas. Reg. 1O3, §§9f .22 (a) -14, 19,43-2; G. C. M. 18123, 1937-1
Cum. Buii. 128. See J. I. Case Co. v. United States, 32 F. Supp. 754 (Ct. Cl.,
194o) and citations there. But cancelled liability is not income where the accrual
was improper. Smith Packing Co., 42 B. T. A. io54 (1940); I PAUL AND MERTENs,
op. cit. supra note 5, at § 5.07.
27. On this point, the decisions are reviewed in Central Loan & Investment Co.,
39 B. T. A. 981 (939). See also 411 C. C. H. 1941 Fed. Tax Serv. 51.653.
28. Houbigant, Inc., 8o F. (2d) 1012 (C. C. A. 2d, 1936), aff'g, 31 B. T. A.
954 (I934), cert. denied, 298 U. S. 669 (1936); Hurd Millwork Corp., 44 B. T. A.
No. 126, June 24, i941; Dixie Margarine Co., 38 B. T. A. 471 (1938), rev'd on other
grounds, 115 F. (2d) 445 (C. C. A. 6th, 194o); i' MOTGom.ERY, OP. cit. supra note
8, at 482.
29. 282 U. S. 359 (1931).
30. M & N Cigar Manufacturers, 42 B. T. A. 1O91 (940); Cartex Mills, Inc.,
42 B. T. A. 894 (1940); Chevy Chase Land Co., 34 B. T. A. i5o (1936); Victoria
Paper Mills Co., 32 B. T. A. 666 (1935), aff'd, 83 F. (2d) 1022 (C. C. A. 2d, 1936) ;
Houbigant, Inc., 31 B. T. A. 954 (1934), aff'd, So F. (2d) io12 (C. C. A. 2d, 1936),
cert. denied, 298 U. S. 669 (1936).
31. Cartex Mills, Inc., 42 B. T. A. 894, 898 (194o), ". . . taxation is a prac-
tical matter."
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both taxpayer and Government. Thus recent Board opinion is that it is
"the best method to reflect income" for the year of deduction and should be
used, except where the income tax liability for that year. has been finally
determined, even though the initial levy was valid (category two).82 And
it is apparent that under subsequent adjustment, changed rates and differ-
ence in surtax brackets will produce a difference in tax liability because of
the "error." This is the very factor which always gives rise to litigation of
the issue, and which causes the Commissioner and taxpayers to shift their
positions according to which method yields a balance favorable to them-
selves.""
However, as Brown points out, retroactive correction of an over-
deduction is impossible after the expiration of the assessment period for
the year of deduction and thus an undeserved windfall is bestowed on the
taxpayer, to the injury of the fiscus. Accordingly, without exception, sub-
sequent adjustment has been required in cases where this is the fact situa-
tion.814 When the statute of limitation has run against'the taxpayer so that
he is unable to secure a refund of the taxes "erroneously" paid, retroactive
correction works a hardship in disallowing deduction of the amount paid
out and beyond recovery. Deduction was allowed to remain, either as
taxes, business loss, or expense, in all the cases where this fact situation
appears. 5 This objection may not be weighty if the taxpayer's own lack
of diligence is responsible for his predicament, but realistically, such punish-
ment may not be deserved, 86 even if generally desirable. Of course, the
statute of limitations will never work to the injury of the taxpayer when
the tax was only accrued, but the Dougherty case, infra, furnishes an excel-
lent example that in other matters he may, by reason of determination of
a status in accordance with the initial tax charge against him, seriously
suffer. Administrative difficulties as well condemn retroactive correction;
interminable recalculation and allocation to past years of fractional parts of
refunds or cancelled liabilities are examples. The desire to permanently
close out tax years and tax cases and the desire for certainty of tax liability
make stronger the argument for determining income tax liability "on annual
periods on the basis of facts as they existed in each period . .. 87
Brown, favoring subsequent adjustment, calls it the "practical method,"
and argues that differences in tax liability under it will in the long run offset
32. E. B. Elliott Co., 45 B. T. A. 82 (1941).
33. In American Light & Traction Co., 42 B. T. A. 1121, 1123 (1940), Murdock,
C., well said: "The Commissioner frequently takes inconsistent positions to the sorrow
of the taxpayers. .. "
34. Union Trust Co. of Indianapolis v. Com'r, xii F. (2d) 6o (C. C. A. 7th,
194o), cert. denied, 31H U. S. 658 (1940) ; Elsie S. Eckstein, 41 B. T. A. 746 (i94o) ;
Estate of Win. H. Block, 39 B. T. A. 338 (1939); Dixie Margarine Co., 38 B. T. A.
471 (1938), rev'd on other grounds, 15 F. (2d) 445 (C. C. A. 6th, i94o) ; Chas. W.
Nash, 34 B. T. A. 675 (936), affd, 88 F. (2d) 477 (C. C. A. 7th, 1937), cert. denied,
301 U. S. 700 (1937); Chevy Chase Land Co., 34 B. T. A. 15o (1936); Victoria
Paper Mills Co., 32 B. T. A. 666 (I935), aff'd, 83 F. (2d) 1022 (C. C. A. 2d, 1936)
(though not stated, it appeared that the assessment period had run at least as to
some of the years of deduction); Houbigant, Inc., 31 B. T. A. 954 (i934), aff'd,
8o F. (2d) 1012 (C. C. A. 2d, 1936), cert. denied, 298 U. S. 669 (1936).
35. Cartex Mills, Inc., 42 B. T. A. 894 (ig4o) ; Dixie Margarine Co., 38 B. T.
A. 47! (1938), rev'd on other grounds, 115 F. (2d) 445 (C. C. A. 6th, I94o); Guitar
Trust Estate, 34 B. T. A. 857 (1936) ; Charles F. Fawsett, 3o B. T. A. 9o8 (1934);
E. L. Bruce Co., ig B. T. A. 777 (0930).
36. In Charles F. Fawsett, 3o B. T. A. 9o8 (934) the statute of limitations had
run against the taxpayer when the taxing statute was declared unconstitutional.
37. See South Dakota Concrete Products Co., 26 B. T. A. 1429 (1932) ; Opper, C.,
dissenting in American Light & Traction Co., 42 B. T. A. 112i, 1125 (194o); Zysman,
Income Derived from the Recovery of Deductions (i94i) 19 TAXES 29.
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each other.88  As to any one taxpayer, this seems highly speculative, and
hardly is reflected by the decisions, which, on analysis, support the conclu-
sion that difference in tax liability is the controlling practical consideration.
There is the answer, however, that the amount in question is never really
net income to the taxpayer until it is freed of this "charge" against it, and
only then is it rightly so included. Practical considerations change with
error in one year as against error in many years, with payment as against
accrual, with running of the statute of limitations against the Government
as running against the taxpayer, with no refund as against refund, with
partial refund as against full refund, with increase in tax rates as against
decrease in tax rates, with taxpayer's profit or loss in the year of deduction
as against profit or loss in the year of discovery of the "error." It is not
surprising that neither Board nor court decisions are consistent,"9 but,
though conflicting views are still clearly cut, a definite rule now appears
in the offing. That the problem is a broad one, arising as to recovery of
any deductible item, as well as to failure to deduct a properly deductible
item, and that certainty is needed has been recognized by the Board, and the
problem's merits excellently argued in its majority and dissenting opinions
in American Light and Traction Co.40 and E. B. Elliott Co.41  The latter
required retroactive correction and will probably become the leading
decision on this problem.
A. Rulings as to First Category
The much criticized 42 Inland Products Co. v. Blair, 31 F. (2d) 867
(C. C. A. 4th, 1929), aff'g, Io B. T. A. 235 (1928), was long regarded as
the leading decision. Deduction of recovered beverage tax payments under
erroneous regulations were disallowed, as the proper method of correction
of a mistake; but it was clearly intimated that the result would be other-
wise (i) had there been no refund, or (2) were the tax liability for the
years of deduction already finally determined. The result seems eminently
fair, and the decision with its exceptions there intimated represents the rule
of retroactive correction.
From 1934 to 1936, five decisions required inclusion in income of
amounts refunded after deduction. In four 4 of these the taxpayer's lia-
bility for the year of deduction had been finally determined by running of
the statute of limitations against the Government. But the theory was
radically new and lifted from the Supreme Court decision in Burnet v.
Sanford & Brooks Co.44 (involving recovery of deductible losses) and the
Board's language in South Dakota Concrete Products Co. (involving re-
covery of amounts embezzled and deducted under various headings):
38. Brown, op. cit. s upra note 2, at p. 387.
39. This inconsistency was much discussed in E. B. Elliott Co., 45 B. T. A. 82
(941).
40. 42 B. T. A. 1121 (1940) (involving an erroneous exclusion from income).
41. 45 B. T. 'A- 82 (1941) (involving treatment of deducted business expenses re-
covered after successful litigation).
42. Cartex Mills, Inc., 42 B. T. A. 894 (894o), and cases there cited. See also
Brown, op. cit. supra note 2.
43. Chas. W. Nash, 34 B. T. A. 675 (1936), af'd, 88 F. (2d) 477 (C. C. A.
7th, 1937), cert. denied, 301 U. S. 700 (937); Chevy Chase Land Co., 34 B. T. A.
i5o (936); Victoria Paper Mills Co., 32 B. T. A. 666 (935), aff'd, 83 F. (2d)
1022 (C. C. A. 2d, 1936); Houbigant, Inc., 31 B. T. A. 954 (1934), aff'd, 8o F. (2d)
1oi2 (C. C. A. 2d, 1936), cert. denied, 298 U. S. 669 (936).
44. 282 U. S. 359 (1931) (there is no mention of the statute of limitations
here; but the tax years of deduction were 1913-16 and the year of the refund was
192o).
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". .. income-tax liability under the Federal revenue acts is to be
determined on annual periods on the basiv of facts as they existed in
each period, and when an adjustment occurs which is inconsistent with
what has been done in the past in the determination of tax liability, the
adjustment should be reflected in reporting income for the year in
which it occurs."
This is the broad rule of subsequent adjustment. It should be noted, how-
ever, that the same result would have been reached in these four cases under
the retroactive correction rule since they fall within the second Inland excep-
tion. The fifth case, Guitar Trust Estate,48 reverted to the theory of retro-
active correction, but since running of the statute of limitations precluded a
refund to the taxpayer, the deduction was allowed to remain. On the facts,
this is the first Inland exception.
The opinion in Dixie Margarine Co.,47 often cited and quoted, quotes
the broad subsequent adjustment rule quoted above, but states the reason
for it to be that at times retroactive adjustment ". . . can not be made
because barred by limitations or is impractical for other reasons .. ,, 48
Commissioner Hill then rationalized past decisions with the conclusion that
deductions were disallowed
".. . only in those cases where refund was received prior to the final
determination of the tax liability for the year in which the refunded
payment was made." 4
On its facts, the decision is not fully within the Inland rule, because sub-
sequent adjustment was required and the statute of limitations precluded
refund as to only a part of the years in which deductions were "erroneously"
taken, and the assessment period had run only as to a part of those years.
Thus the Board, after examination of precedent, seemed to adopt the broad
rule of subsequent adjustment.
The Court of Claims, in 1939, however, decided the Inland case, taken
there under the name Bohemian Breweries, Inc., v. United States,5 0 just as
it had been decided before, in dictum 5 stating the second Inland exception
as a separate rule justified by the facts which invoked it.
Elsie S. Eckstein " involved treatment of cancelled real estate tax
liability accrued and deducted in 1932 and 1934, cancellation being due to
a discovery of overassessment. The Board required subsequent adjustment
for 1932, but retroactive correction for 1934, ascertainment that the deduc-
tion of the latter year was excessive having been "prior to the final deter-
mination of his income tax liability for such year. . . ." Thus two rules
and an exception 53 seem to have evolved from the Inland case.
The declaration of invalidity of the Agricultural Adjustment Act in
1936 54 resulted in several decisions on this problem. The well-considered
45. 26 B. T. A. 1429, 1432 (1932) (italics supplied). Also there: ". . the
deductions are practical necessities due to our inability to read the future, and the
inclusion of the recovery in income is necessary to offset the deduction."
46. 34 B. T. A. 857 (1936). See cases cited in note 35 supra.
47. 38 B. T. A. 471 (1938), rev'd on other grounds, 115 F. (2d) 445 (C. C. A.
6th, 194o).
48. Italics supplied.
49. 38 B. T. A. 471, 475 (938) (italics supplied), rev'd ons other grounds, 115
F. (2d) 445 (C. C. A. 6th, 194o).
50. 27 F. Supp. 588 (Ct. Cl., 1939).
51. Id. at 592.
52. 41 B. T. A. 746 (194o).
53. Where the taxpayer is unable to secure a refund.
54. United States v. Butler, 297 U. S. I (1936).
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opinion by Commissioner Kern in Cartex Mills, Inc. 5 (October 9, 194o)
criticizes the Inland case, recognizes the practical liability imposed by the
unconstitutional statute and the propriety of accrual under it, and refuses
to observe any distinction between payment, and accrual and later payment.
However, he states the rationale set forth in the Dixie Margarine Co. case
as the then present rule of the Board, and the broad subsequent adjustment
rule of South Dakota Concrete Products Co. as the reason therefor. On
the facts, moreover, it appeared that the taxpayer could secure no refund,
thus bringing the case within the Dixie rationale or the Inland exception,
and subsequent adjustment was required without invoking the broad rule.
In Estate of David Davies,56 Eckert Packing Co.,57 and Smith Packing
Co.,58 processing taxes were either paid in escrow (pending litigation of
the AAA's constitutionality) or merely accrued. The statute of limitations
was involved in none. Retroactive correction was required in all. Writing
the first opinion, the same Commissioner Kern found a ruling distinction
between accrued and never paid, and accrued and later paid. From the
language in these opinions, Cartex Mills, Inc. seemed limited to cases where
the taxes had been paid but were unrefunded at the time of the filing of the
petition.59 This would allow subsequent adjustment though the statute of
limitations had run against neither taxpayer nor Government-a position
somewhere between the Inland rule and the broad subsequent adjustment
rule.
M & N Cigar Manufacturers, Inc. sustained deductions of processing
taxes paid in 1933, 1934, 1935, and 1936, though at the time of the filing of
the petition a compromise refund had been made. The broad subsequent
adjustment rule was quoted; and it was observed: 60
"We think that the fact that a refund has been made to petitioner does
not serve to distinguish it from the Cartex Mills, Inc. case."
Any distinction between a refunded payment and a discharged accrual of
liability is difficult to discover, but the necessity of allocation of fractional
portions of a compromise refund would discourage the adoption of the retro-
active correction method. 6' But the year of deduction was not finally closed
here, nor do the facts show a running of the statute of limitations against
the taxpayer.
The court decision in the Dougherty 62 case was to allow deductions of
taxes never paid but accrued under an unconstitutional statute. This was
the logical advance from the M & N decision in the transition toward sub-
sequent adjustment in all situations. It cannot be ignored, however, that
to hold otherwise in this case would have subjected the taxpayer to a
$:24,097.41 deficiency in undistributed profits surtax, when on the evidence
55. 42 B. T. A. 894 (1940).
56. 42 B. T. A. 965 Q194o).
57. 42 B. T. A. iooo (940).
58. 42 B. T. A. 1054 (940).
59. Note in Estate of David Davies, 42 B. T. A. 965, 969 (194o): ". • • if
any part . . . is refunded to the taxpayer in a year subsequent to the filing of the
petition or the final determination of the tax liability for the year in which such
taxes were paid, then the amount so refunded is . . . income for the year in which
such refund is made."
6o. 42 B. T. A. IO9I, lO93 (1940).
61. The decision was so rationalized with retroactive correction in E. B. Elliott
Co., 45 B. T. A. 82, 92 (I94).
62. J. A. Dougherty Sons, Inc., 121 F. (2d) 700 (C. C. A. 3d, 1941), reeg, 42
B. T. A. 892 (194o). The court commented upon the hardship retroactive correc-
tion would impose on the taxpayer, but concluded that the taxypayer was entitled to
take the deduction, under the statute.
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he would have been liable for none but for the statute's unconstitutionality.
Was this just another reason for the rule, or was it a fact limitation on the
scope of the decision as authority?
Though silent on it, the majority of the Board must have thought the
latter. E. B. Elliott Co., September 12, 1941, presented the problem of
treatment of business expenses deducted, but recovered after litigation re-
sulted in a determination that the rates charges the taxpayer were excessive.
The Board reopened and discussed the whole problem here considered.
The majority found the obligation on the taxpayer "provisionally valid,"
and the deductions justifiable when made, but: 63
".. the rule . . . is that all refunds of paid taxes are to be
adjusted to the years in which the taxes were paid and deductions
claimed, as the best method to reflect income; . . . where the statute
of limitations or some other consideration has made it impossible . . .
the refund must then be treated as income in the year of receipt."
There were six dissents, 64 three dissenting opinions, principally on the
grounds that accrual was proper under United States v. Anderson, that
"each tax year stands by itself" under Burnet v. Sanford & Brooks Co. and
numerous Board decisions in point, that the privilege to deduct and duty to
include in income should not depend on the "fortuitous" and "unrelated"
circumstance of the running of the statute of limitations, and that subsequent
adjustment was a "more practical rule."
No similar case since that decision has failed to follow the majority's
position, though to do so required arithmetical gymnastics in making retro-
active allocations of partial refunds."5
Thus the trend seems to have been alternately from retroactive to sub-
sequent, and back to retroactive, with the latter presently in sway. How-
ever, on the facts of the cases, subsequent adjustment seems to have been
favored only when urged by some practical consideration other than the
usual administrative difficulties. Though more likely, it is today doubtful
the mere showing of payment and non-recovery is sufficient to invoke the
rule of subsequent adjustment.
B. Rulings as to the Second Category
The Treasury early advised that treatment of refunds of taxes legally
levied-as distinguished from those illegally levied--did not involve the
correction of a mistake, and such refund was always income when re-
ceived. 6
That distinction was relied upon by both the Board and the Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals in Com'r v. Central United National Bank,67 and
the amount saved by a compromise of accrued tax liability for past years
was treated as income of the year of the compromise. The court concluded
63. 45 B. T. A. 82, 92 (1941).
64. Smith, VanFossan, Murdock, Sternhagen, Arnold, and Black. Only Commis-
sioner Murdock's dissent mentioned the court decision in the Doughwrty case.
65. Security Flour Mills Co., 45 B. T. A. No. iog, November 12, 1941 (to
retroactively correct the deduction of processing taxes, 5287o96/31878378 of the refund
was reallocated to I935-there were five dissents). Dixie Pine Products Co., 45 B.
T. A. No. 5o, October 7, 1941, 90 U. OF PA. L. Ray. 367 (involving cancella-
tion of accrued liability for misapplied gasoline tax). Cf. Budd International
Corp., 45 B. T. A. No. 119, November 19, 1941; Schwabacher Hardware Co., 45
B. T. A. No. 113, November 13, i941.
66. Mim. 3958, XI-2 Cum. Buuz. 33 (1932); 411 C. C. H. 1941 Fed. Tax Serv.
151.653; 3 PAUL AVD MERTENS, op. cit. s zpra note 5, at 213.
67. 99 F. (2d) 568 (C. C. A. 6th, 1938), aff'g, 33 B. T. A. 588 (1935).
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that the Bank was "entitled to" the deductions, since the taxes were valid
obligations and therefore properly accrued.
Though the legal-illegal distinction was mentioned and the statute of
limitations had run against the Government, the Board in Estate of Win.
Block "1 (1939) expressly disapproved of retroactive correction and quoted
again the broad subsequent adjustment rule of South Dakota Concrete
Products Co. Citing analogous cases involving recovered bad debts, losses,
business expenses, etc., a tax refund due to a retroactive statute was
accordingly held properly includable in income for the year of the refund.
On similar theory, the same result was reached in Union Trust Co. of
Indianapolis v. Com"r 69 (February, 194o) and J. I. Case v. United States 70
(May, 194o). The statute of limitations had run against the Government
in the former case, but not in the latter. The latter case did not involve
payments; accruals of tax liability were discharged by retroactive statute.
That taxes for later years were assessed on the basis of amounts discharged
was held immaterial, for a properly accrued liability had been discharged,
and income had thus been produced. The easy working of subsequent
adjustment was thus well illustrated. No statute of limitations was involved
in Hurd Millwork Corp.,71 decided June 24, 1941, where accrued real estate
tax liability which had been cancelled due to a compromise was required to
be included in income for the year of the compromise.
But in September, the E. B. Elliott Co. opinion produced a theory of
retroactive correction so broad as to eliminate even the legal-illegal dis-
tinction--only the ultimate tax liaiblity for the year of deduction was to be
ultimately deducted, except when impossible to correct retroactively. Ac-
cordingly, in Budd International Corp., November 19, 1941," the Board,
following the Elliott decision and theory, reached the same result where
retroactive statutes caused a change in deducted tax liability.
Thus the same alternation in theory is seen in this category of cases.
The levy is legal and the deduction would therefore be allowed to remain
under the Inland case, or under the broad subsequent adjustment rule.
Expressly was it said in the Elliott opinion that Con'r v. Central United
National Bank was never intended to mean that deductions of validly levied
taxes would not be reduced in the amount of any refund,7" but that the
compromise there was a separate transaction resulting in income, and was
unrelated to any prior action. Would not the accordance of full weight to
that rationale be a strong argument for subsequent adjustment? The
theories are opposed; satisfactory rationale would seem difficult, consider-
ing that members of the Board dissented to Central United National Bank
on the very theory later propounded by the majority in the Elliott case.
Prevalence of the Elliott theory requires retroactive correction, whenever
possible, in the second category also.
C. Rulings as to Third Category
In Leach v. Com'r'4 (1931) the taxpayer in good faith had overpaid
an estate tax. The first Circuit Court of Appeals followed the Inland
68. 39 B. T. A. 338 (939).
69. 1II F. (2d) 6o (C. C. A. 7th, 194o), cert. denied, 311 U. S. 658 (194o).
70. 32 F. Supp. 754 (Ct. Cl., 1940).
71. 44 B. T. A. No. 126, June 24, 1941.
72. 45 B. T. A. No. 1ig, November 19, 1941.
73. ". . . it certainly does not justify the generalization sometimes drawn from
these invalid tax cases that the refund of every valid tax will constitute income in
the year of the refund; and it may be doubted whether the court so meant it." E. B.
Elliott Co., 45 B. T. A. 82, 93 (1941).
74. 50 F. (2d) 371 (C. C. A. Ist, I932), af'g, 16 B. T. A. 781 (1929).
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decision and required correction of the "mistake" by reducing the deduction
by the amount of the refund.
Overpaid excess profits taxes refunded in 1935 were adjudged income
for that year in Walter M. Marston and Elizabeth C. Marston.5 On its
facts, the decision was within the second Inland exception, since the assess-
ment period had run as to the year of deduction; the same was true in the
cases here relied on by the Board, though many of them were decided on
the broad rule of subsequent adjustment.
There have been too few decisions in this category to reflect the vaga-
ries of Board theory, but on its facts no case is in conflict with retroactive
correction.
III. THE BENEFIT PROBLEM
Under the early or the Elliott rule of retroactive correction, the amount
of recovery will be treated as income for the year of recovery when the year
of deduction has been closed. Under the broad subsequent adjustment rule,
the amount recovered is always income for the year of recovery. But sup-
pose the taxpayer shows that his deduction was of no benefit to him when
"taken" because of a net loss during that year, and that to include in income
in the year of recovery will increase his tax liability for that year. To then
require the inclusion of the full amount as income is to subject the taxpayer
to liability to which he would not have been subject but for the "error."
Thus, inclusion of the amount in gross income in different years may result
in different ultimate tax liabilities according to the taxpayer's net profit or
loss in the years in question.
The exact problem was raised in Central Loan & Investment Co.7 6 in
1939, and the Board, reviewing the decisions and quoting the broad subse-
quent adjustment rule, concluded that inclusion in income for the year of
recovery had always been required, only because the amount "had been
deducted previously to offset income." Refunded taxes paid under an
unconstitutional statute were accordingly held includable in the income for
the year of the refund only to the extent of the tax benefit from the de-
duction.
In the Marston case, 77 the Commissioner conceded that, though the
assessment period had run, refunds of taxes overpaid by mistake were
income for the year of recovery only if the deduction had resulted in tax
benefit.
In June, 194o,78 a General Counsel memorandum announced a refusal
to acquiesce in Central Loan & Investment Co., and that, if the deduction
was allowed to remain, the amount thereof recovered would be considered
income in the year of recovery "irrespective of whether the allowance of the
deduction resulted in a tax benefit to the taxpayer." The same view was
advised to apply to recoveries of deducted taxes also. That memorandum
was followed, on authority of Burnet v. Sanford & Brooks Co., in Stearns
Coal & Lumber Co. v. Glenn 79 (D. C., W. D. Ky., December 5, 1941) as
to amounts deducted as bad debts but later recovered.
75. 41 B. T. A. 847 (194o). The "deduction" had been accomplished by a re-
duction in reported distributed share of partnership profits.
76. 39 B. T. A. 981 (i939). See the decisions and Treasury rulings there
cited. The authority all seemed then in accord, except, by analogy, Lake View
Trust & Savings Bank, 27 B. T. A. 290 (932), which involved recovered bad debts.
Cf. Burnet v. Sanford & Brooks Co., 282 U. S. 359 (i931), as to business expenses.
77. 41 B. T. A. 847 (94o).
78. G. C. M. 22163, 194o-2 Cum. BuLT. 76. See 411 C. C. H. 1941 Fed. Tax
Serv. ff207.645.
79. 41x C. C. H-1. 1941 Fed. Tax Serv. fr 9781 (W. D. Ky. 194I).
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Up to within a month before it, however, the Board had expressed
opinion squarely contra the Stearns view, both as to bad debt recoveries and
tax recoveries.80
The Stearns view is consistent with the theory of the broad subsequent
adjustment rule, "each year shall be treated on its merits"; there is income;
it must be so included; prior action is immaterial. But in tax cases this
method was adopted, and is retained in the exceptions to even the broad
rule of retroactive correction, only as a method more practical than retro-
active correction. To apply it so as to substantially increase the taxpayer's
liability because of his inability to see into the future seems most imprac-
tical.8 1  Then does the Stearns view check with the reason for the rule it
relies on?
There is again the forceful answer that the amount in question was
not usable income while paid out or buried in "reserves," and ought not to
be taxed as net income during that period-that it became usable income
when received as a refund or relieved of the "charge" against it, and ought
then to be taxed as net income. Moreover, though the taxpayer will suffer
when he sustains a profit in the year of refund, he will conversely be bene-
fited when he has suffered a loss in that year; for the amount then never
will be taxed as net income.
Whether the Board will follow the Stearns case remains to be seen.
If it does, it will seem to have again swung to the theory of subsequent
adjustment.
IV. CONcLUSION
Three theories lie in the decisions:
Earliest was the Inland theory of retroactive correction: since an
invalid statute, regulation, or assessment, or excessive self-assessment
imposes no liability, payment or accrual under it is an improper deduction;
the deduction, therefore, must be corrected. Since a legal levy imposes
liability, payment or accrual under it is a proper deduction, and any
decrease in tax liability is income when it occurs.
Most recent is the broad Elliott theory of retroactive correction: any
tax levy by a government is "provisionally" valid, and justifies deduction
of a payment or accrual thereunder. But only the ultimate liability should
ultimately be deducted; therefore, any decrease in liability requires a reduc-
tion of the deduction.
The broad subsequent adjustment rule of South Dakota Concrete
Products Co. is the third: deduction of taxes paid or accrued in good faith
will not be disturbed after the taxable year by reason of a discovery that
the ultimate tax liability is less than the amount deducted; for each annual
period stands by itself.
The first two theories aim to produce the exact tax liability but for the
"error" and therefore make exceptions: subsequent adjustment is (i)
required when the year of deduction has been finally closed, and (2) al-
lowed when the statute of limitations precludes refund of the deducted
tax.8 2
8o. As to tax recoveries: Hurd Millwork Corp., 44 B. T. A. 72 (I94) ; Walter
M. Marston, 41 B. T. A. 847 (i94o); Central Loan & Investment Co., 39 B. T. A.
981 (1939). As to bad debts: Nat'l Bank of Commerce of Seattle v. Com'r, 15
F. (2d) 875 (C. C. A. 9th, I94O), aff'g, 4o B. T. A. 72 (1939) ; State-Planters Bank
& Trust Co., 45 B. T. A. No. IOI, November 7, 1941. Cf. Amsco-Wire Products
Corp., 44 B. T. A. No. II5, June 13, 1941.
81. See Zysman, note 37 supra, at 32.
82. Congress, by § 820 of the Revenue Act of 1938, attempted to solve somewhat
similar problems by removal of the bar in certain cases. IxT. REV. CODE §3801
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The distinction between legally and illegally levied taxes seems largely
theoretical. It is given effect only in the Inland theory.83
Though no legal distinction appears, subsequent adjustment is always
more likely where there is payment rather than accrual, particularly if the
accrued taxes were resisted by the taxpayer.8 4
Rationale of the decisions is easiest on the Inland theory, easier still
if the second exception be extended to include cases of particular hardship
on the taxpayer. A taxpayer finding the Elliott theory in his favor prob-
ably will prevail today before the Board. However, a strong minority fights
for subsequent adjustment.
Practical considerations are responsible for the rule of subsequent
adjustment in these cases; treating each tax year as closed after twelve
months immediately dissolves most injustices and administrative problems,
and is certain and simple to understand. Subsequent adjustment may be
based on the quite acceptable theory that funds are hardly usable income
until relieved of any clog upon them, though it be illegally placed, and only
then should it be taxed as such; and further, that deduction is of right
under the statute if taken under such liability as is imposed in most of
these cases. These arguments would seem to outweigh the objection based
on differences in tax liability. Practically, it is yet doubtful, however, that
this objection ought to 'be strengthened by requirement of inclusion in
income of amounts beyond the tax benefit derived from the deduction.
Advocates of subsequent adjustment yet may have hope. Above all, cer-
tainty is needed.
W.B.J.
Equity Jurisdiction to Remove Cloud on Title Acquired by Adverse
Possession
I. POLICY OF TME LAW
One of the most valuable incidents of the ownership of land is the
power to sell it. This power is made more valuable by the recognition
of a right that inconsistent claims of ownership shall not be uttered. The
price that people will pay for land, in fact their very willingness to buy it,
depends to a considerable degree upon the assurance they can be given
that their vendor is the true owner. Indeed, it is a public policy to provide
this certainty, as well as the private interest of achieving marketability,
that is being fostered by granting to the true owner of land the privilege
of striking down inconsistent claims of ownership.
Recognizing that peculiar situations require special consideration, the
common law developed various devices by which this privilege could be
exercised. Thus, when the owner is not in possession of his property,
and the adverse claim is made by one in possession, the owner has avail-
(1939), 26 U. S. C. A. §380 (1940). Of course, Congressional action could not
remove state limitations and thus entitle the taxpayer to a refund.
83. In all these cases, the taxpayer in good faith and, for practical purposes,
under compulsion, bears an initial liability. In all, it is ultimately reduced or elim-
inated.
84. Estate of David Davies, 42 B. T. A. 965 (1940): "... it is obviously
more just and infinitely more practical to make the proper adjustment in the tax-
payer's income for the year in which the deduction was claimed . . ." Similar
Board language appears in other cases where no tax payment was made: Dixie Pine
Products Co., 45 B. T. A. No. 50, October 7, 1941;1 J. A. Dougherty Sons, Inc., 42
B. T. A. 892 (I94O), rev'd, 121 F. (2d) 700 (C. C. A. 3d, 1941).
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able to him the remedy of ejectment.' On the other hand, when the owner
is in possession, and this remedy at law is unavailable, he may employ
one of three remedies that have been devised by the courts of equity.
2
These remedies have been frequently confused 8 and in many jurisdictions
have been virtually consolidated by the statutory action to quiet title.
4
They proceed upon different theories, however, and have been designed
to meet different needs. Thus, the bill of peace protects against harassing
litigation; 5 the bill quia timet prevents loss of evidence; 1 and the bill to
remove cloud from title promotes marketability by eradicating claims that
make the title doubtful.
7
The above-indicated public interest in providing for certainty in the
title to real estate was also a moving factor in the development of record-
ing systems." However, even a recorded title may be rendered doubtful
by a long-continued possession under a claim of ownership inconsistent
with that appearing on the record. Under modern law this seems to be
the only justification for the recognition of adverse possession as a means
of acquiring title. 9
If it is true that modern statutes of limitation provide, not only for
the loss of remedy, but for the extinguishment of the original title and the
creation of a new title in the adverse possessor because of this desire for
certainty,10 it becomes evident that this same demand for certainty, which
grants the privilege of maintaining a bill to remove cloud from title, war-
rants the acquisition of title itself by adverse possession. The first Amer-
ican case recognizing a jurisdiction to remove cloud from title 11 strongly
I. Of course, the action of ejectment, like the action of replevin to recover per-
sonal property, is primarily designed to return the land to its dispossessed owner.
Yet, if the action succeeds, the invalidity of an adverse claim has been determined
and, to this extent, the right that such claims not be made has been enforced.
2. WALsH, EQuiTY (1930) §§ 116 (Bills Quia Timet), 117 (Bills to Remove
Cloud and to Quiet Title), 118 (Bills of Peace).
3. CLARK, EQUITY (1937) § 413; WALsEa, op. cit. .rpra note 2, at 551.
4. 4 PomEROY, EQuITY JuISPRUDE cE (5th ed. 1941) §§ 1396, 1397; Note (1937)
25 CALIF. L. REv. 565-571.
5. This remedy is properly resorted to where the adverse claim of ownership
is being asserted by legal means. Once the plaintiff's title has withstood an attack
by way of an attempted ejectment, he is privileged to "quiet" it by enjoining fur-
ther attempts at dispossession. Stating the theory another way, after one unsuc-
cessful attack, the defendant has a duty to refrain from repeating his invalid claim
in the future.
6. This remedy is one of precautionary justice. The plaintiff fears that, if an
adverse claim is permitted to go unchallenged when he is prepared to refute it, he
may lose his evidence, and thus be unable to establish his interest at some future time.
7. This remedy is not desired so much for protection against future litigation or
loss of evidence, but rather to free prospective purchasers from any doubts as to
the validity of the title they will acquire, and thereby protect the jus disponendi of
the owner. See Howard, Bills to Renvove Cloud From Title (1917) 25 W. VA. L.
Q. 4, 10.
8. PHImLBucx, PROPERTY (1939) 464-478; 5 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY (3rd ed.
1939) § 1262.
9. Some jurisdictions have abolished the acquisition of title by adverse posses-
sion by adopting the Torrens System of title registration. This movement has been
criticized as violatug the sound policy of the limitations acts. 4 TIFFANY, op. cit.
supra note 8, § 1132.
io. Ballantine, Title by Adverse Possession (1918) 32 HARv. L. REv. 135. "The
statute has not for its object to reward the diligent trespasser for his wrong nor yet
to penalize the negligent and dormant owner for sleeping upon his rights; the great
purpose is automatically to quiet all titles which are openly and consistently asserted,
to provide proof of meritorious titles, and correct errors in conveyancing."
n. The jurisdiction is generally considered as having been originated in the
English Chancery by Lord Eldon, the principal case being Hayward v. Dimsdale,
17 Ves. 111, 34 Eng. Rep. R. 43 (18io). See Howard, supra note 7, at 5-7.
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supports this proposition. Chief Justice John Marshall said in Alexander
v. Pendleton, "The appellee's title, being secured by a possession of more
than fifty years, is unquestionably good, and it is proper, that the doubts
which hang over it, should be removed." 12 It is not surprising, therefore,
that the weight of American decisions gives the holder of a title acquired
by adverse possession the privilege of having clouds removed from his
title.1 Certainty in title and its attendant marketability can only be
achieved by removing all claims that question its validity.1 4
II. SITUATIONS WHEREIN RELIEF Is NEEDED
There are four possible fact situations out of which a bill to remove
a cloud from title acquired by adverse possession may arise:
I) Title acquired by adverse possession in reliance on a worth-
less document of title is clouded by the deed of the original owner.
2) Title acquired by adverse possession without any such color
of title is clouded by the deed of the original owner.
3) Title acquired by adverse possession with color of title is
clouded by a claim of title never valid as to the adverse possessor, i. e.,
invalid for reasons other than the running of the statute.
4) Title acquired by adverse possession without color of title is
clouded by a claim of title never valid as to the adverse possessor.
Though the courts do not attempt any classification of the cases according
to this factual analysis, they can best be discussed by following it.
Most of the cases fall within the first fact situation. The adverse
possessor has entered the land under an invalid conveyance, 5 tax deed'
6
or some other document purporting to give him a title.'7  In many cases,
in addition to his adverse possession for the statutory period, he has spent
money in making improvements to the property and has paid taxes levied
against it.'8 After the statutory period has run, the former owner or his
heirs assert the now extinguished claim. Sometimes this may be by an
ejectment action. As has already been indicated, where there is likely to
be a repetition of unsuccessful actions, a bill of peace can successfully be
maintained.'9 Frequently, however, the holder of the extinguished title
does not take legal steps to assert his claim, but merely lets it be known
that he has a deed to the land. Or such deed may appear as a matter of
12. 8 Cranch 462, 470 (U. S. 1814). The suit was designated as a bill to quiet
title, but the plaintiff was not seeking to protect himself from litigation. According
to the statement of the facts (id. at 466), he was about to sell his land and in order
to make a satisfactory conveyance, desired a deed from the defendant to a portion
thereof that he had acquired by adverse possession.
13. CLARK, op. cit. supra note 3, § 417; 2 PomEaoy, EQuirTABLE REMEDIEs, (2nd
ed. 1919) § 73o. Cases are collected in Note (1932) 78 A. L. R. 24, 11o-116.
14. It should be noted that not all adverse claims will be considered as clouds
upon the owner's title. A very arbitrary rule followed by many courts is that only
when the adverse claim is expressed by some written instrument will it be con-
sidered a cloud. Other courts-confusing quia timet jurisdiction with that protecting
the jus disponendi-will not consider an instrument as constituting a cloud if it
appears invalid on its face. A more liberal and more practical view will exercise the
jurisdiction wherever any adverse claim exists, however groundless it may be or in
whatever manner asserted. CLARK, op. cit. mspra note 3, § 414.
15. Contee v. Lyons, ig D. of C. 2o7 (189o); Jones v. Georgia R. Co., 6 Ga.
718 (1879) (grantor conveyed same land twice).
I6. Chicago v. Middlebrooke, 143 Ill. 265, 32 N. E. 457 (1892).
17. Arrington v. Liscom, 34 Cal. 365 (1868) (sheriff's deed at foreclosure sale).
i8. Such was the situation in the cases cited in notes 16 and 17 supra.
19. See note 5 supra.
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public record and thereby dissuade prospective buyers from purchasing,20
for the title remains in doubt as long as the deed is permitted to stand.
Courts recognize this fact, and statements similar to that of Sawyer, C. J.,
in Arrington v. Liscom 21 are common:
"We see no good reason why the party, whose adverse possession
has practically ripened into a title, should not be entitled to all the
remedies to quiet his possession. . . . Statutes of Limitations are
said to be statutes of repose. If so, they should be so construed and
administered with respect to cases falling within their purview, as to
afford complete, not merely partial, repose."
Some courts go so far as to say that title acquired by adverse possession
is a title in fee simple, and therefore may be used in an offensive, as well
as a purely defensive, action against even the holder of record title.22 In
the light of the general principles previously indicated, these decisions
seem to be sound. Two parties-neither morally culpable-have claims
to the same tract of land; and, given a public policy to quiet title in favor
of the one in long-continued possession, it seems a necessary corollary that
the no longer valid record title should be eradicated.
However, courts in three American jurisdictions 23 have refused to
remove the cloud of the original owner's deed where there was what might
be termed a "good faith" adverse possession. In Contee v. Lyons the court
confused a bill to remove cloud with a bill of peace, and denied relief be-
cause the plaintiff was not being disturbed in his possession. 24 Moreover,
though the case was decided in 189o-76 years after Chief Justice Mar-
shall's opinion in Alexander v. Pendleton-the plaintiff's request was con-
sidered novel, and one which the court lacked precedent to grant.25
Another argument advanced in these minority jurisdictions is that there
is no need to remove a cloud from a title by adverse possession, for "Time
never crumbles prescriptive title, but only solidifies it, converting, as it
were, the loose sand into imperishable stone." 26 Such are pretty words,
but hardly practical ones. Prescriptive title must necessarily depend upon
the recollections of human beings, matter not of record and most likely to
be lost as evidence. However, the theory is more fundamentally at fault.
It confuses a bill quia timet with a bill to protect the jus disponendi. The
plaintiff asks removal of the cloud, not only because he fears he cannot
later prove his title, but also because he wants a title that he can readily
market.
The second fact situation arises where the title resulted from an
adverse possession without any color of title in the adverse possessor, and
the cloud is the former owner's deed. Encroachment cases form the first
class in this category. In McCoy v. Johnson 7 the plaintiff's house en-'
croached upon the defendant's premises. Though an investigation of their
2o. Jackson v. Wax, 20 Del. Ch. 93, I71 Atl. 755 (934).
21. 34 Cal. 365, 386 (1868).
22. See Leonard v. Leonard, 369 Ill. 572, 577, 17 N. E. (2d) 553, 555 (1938);
People v. Hatch, 350 Ill. 586, 594, 595, 183 N. E. 61o, 613 (932); Dean v. God-
dard, 55 Minn. 290, 294, 295, 56 N. W. io6o, io6i (1893).
23. Contee v. Lyons, ig D. of C. 207 (i8go) ; Jones v. Georgia R. Co., 62 Ga. 718
(1879); Taylor v. Staples, 8 R. I. 170 (1865) (adverse possessor relied on alleged
gift of the land).
24. 19 D. of C. 207, 216 (i89O).
25. Id. at 218.
26. Jones -v. Georgia R. Co., 62 Ga. 718, 723, 724 (1879); accord, Taylor v.
Staples, 8 R. I. 170, 181 (1865).
27. 70 Md. 49o, 17 Atl. 387 (1889).
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deeds would have disclosed it, neither party. knew of this fact until after
the plaintiff had acquired title to the property by adverse possession. When
a suit in the nature of a bill to remove a cloud from title was brought
before the court, relief was denied on the theory that the plaintiff was
seeking to have his title established in a court of equity, whereas only a
court of law has jurisdiction to establish title.28  Other courts have had
no such qualms, 29 and the theory has been adversely criticized.30 It would
seem that relief should be granted in cases of this kind. Where an inno-
cent mistake has resulted in an encroachment and title to the land en-
croached upon has been obtained by adverse possession, the building should
be made marketable by removing grounds for fear that it may have to be
torn down. It is admitted that the adverse possessor has not been misled
by a worthless title document, nor has he given any value for the land,
yet the hardship seems sufficiently great to warrant relief.
Another class of cases in this second fact situation is where the plain-
tiff went on the premises with the definite intention of "stealing" it by
adverse possession. One would think that if the "clean hands" doctrine
were of any moment, it would apply in such a situation.31 A plaintiff, who
admits he has been a wilful trespasser, certainly doesn't have clean hands.
A relatively recent case denying relief apparently proceeded on this
theory.8 2 The court reasoned that one who has acquired land ought to be
content with the title the statute gives him, and he should not, without
some further equity (as, for example, color of title), be permitted to rein-
force it by coming into chancery to compel a release of the title which he
has superseded. With this view we have a great deal of sympathy, but
there are objections to it. As a comment upon the case has pointed out,
there is a public interest that favors granting the relief demanded. 3 The
public demands that the title records be accurate, and this accuracy cannot
be achieved unless invalid deeds are stricken from the record.
The acquisition and extinction of easements 4 by adverse user involves
the same basic principles heretofore discussed. Where an easement has
been extinguished by adverse user, any further claim thereto, whether by
recorded instrument or otherwise, clouds the title to the servient estate;
and in this kind of situation relief has been granted.32 The acquisition of
an easement by prescription presents a more difficult problem. An ease-
ment is an interest in land, and the deed to the servient estate (which
appears free and clear of the easement) is in a sense a cloud upon it.
Though no cases have been found on this point, it seems that some remedy
should be available if the easement is assignable. 6 The purpose of such
28. Id. at 492, 17 At. at 387.
29. Marston v. Rowe, 39 Ala. 722 (1866) ; Jackson v. Wax, 2o Del. Ch. 93, 171
Atl. 755 (934) ; Dean v. Goddard, 55 Minn. 290, 56 N. W. io6o (1893) ; Tourtelotte
v. Pearce, 27 Neb. 57, 42 N. W. 915 (889).
30. (19o4) i8 UAhiv. L. REv. 147.
3i. It is a familiar maxim that "he who comes into equity must come with clean
hands." See CLARx, op. cit. supra note 3, §§ 30, 417.
32. Day v. Cemetery, 51 R. I. 213, i53 Atl. 312, 79 U. oF PA. L. RLv. 98i (193i).
33. (1931) 79 U. OF PA. L. REv. 981.
34. This discussion is also applicable to profits a prendre, and other assignable
interests in land.
35. Vier v. Detroit, ilI Mich. 646, 70 N. W. "139 (1897) ; Louttit v. Alexander,
44 R. I. 257, x16 Atl. 882 (1922). It is interesting to note that in Rhode Island relief
has been refused where an entire estate had been acquired by adverse possession.
Taylor v. Staples, 8 R. I. 170 (I865); Day v. Cemetery, 5I R. I. 213, 153 AtI. 312,
79 U. OF PA. L. REv. 981 (193).
36. In some jurisdictions only easements appurtenant are assignable. PHILERICK,
op. cit. supra note 8, at 280-281. Where the easement is not assignable, there is no
question of marketability and no necessity for relief.
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remedy would be to make the existence of the easement a matter of
record. This could best be accomplished by an order directing a convey-
ance from the owner of the servient estate.
Because of the scarcity of litigation and the relative simpleness of the
issues involved, fact situations three and four can be discussed together.
The claim which constitutes the cloud in these situations never was valid
against the adverse possessor. If the adverse possessor was "innocent"-
either under a color of title, or through a mistake, the equities are definitely
in favor of granting the relief prayed. 3 7 If the adverse possession was in
"bad faith", the parties are both claiming that in which morally they have
no interest, but the adverse possessor has the fact of a continuous posses-
sion in his favor. In both situations, a court sooner or later will decree in
an ejectment action that by virtue of the adverse possession an invulnerable
title has been acquired. To give recognition to this fact in advance might
prevent injury to some innocent person.
A few special problems remain to be noted. First of all, it must be
remembered that an action to remove a cloud cannot be founded upon a
mere adverse possession. The possession must have been for the prescribed
period, and of such a nature (open, notorious, continuous, and under a
claim of right) as to have ripened into title under the prevailing statute of
limitations.38 Secondly, it must be pointed out that frequently clouds are
removed from title as relief incidental to the basic purpose of the action. 9
This is often true in the genuine bill of peace situation. The defendant
is not only enjoined from harassing the plaintiff with repeated ejectment
actions, but the deed upon which they might be based is cancelled.40 Then
too, it should be mentioned that courts recognize as a corollary to the
jurisdiction to remove clouds, a jurisdiction to prevent their formation.4 1
This latter jurisdiction has been exercised where the title protected had
been acquired by adverse possession.42 Finally, a claim of title by adverse
possession may be the cloud on title in a given case. Whether such claim
will be removed depends upon the position of the given jurisdiction as to
what constitutes a cloud on title.4" Such claims have been removed where
they had been recorded; 4 and there are dicta to the effect that even if
they are merely oral assertions, relief will be granted by way of injunction.4 5
III. NATURE OF RELIEF
Having established that, regardless of both the nature of the adverse
possession that eventually ripens into title and the history of the claim
that constitutes the cloud, an all-important public policy dictates that relief
be granted, it follows that the relief given should fully satisfy the demands
that warrant it. Generally a cloud in the form of a written instrument
37. Cf. Clemmons et al. v. Cox, 1n6 Ala. 567, 23 So. 79 (897). See also Baker
v. Clark, 128 Cal. 181, 6o Pac. 677 (I9OO).
38. Flannery v. Hightower, 97 Ga. 592, 25 S. E. 371 (1895).
39. This is true of many statutory actions to quiet title. See note 4 supra.
4o. Harmon v. Dyer, 3 MacArth. 292 (D. C. 1878).
41. 4 POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE (5th ed. i941) § 1398.
42. Gardner v. Terry, 99 Mo. 523, 12 S. W. 888 (0890) (enjoining sale of land
to which P had acquired title by adverse possession).
43. See note 14 supra.
44. Day v. Cemetery, 5I R. I. 213, 153 At. 312, 79 U. OF PA. L. REv. 98i (I93I).
In Pennsylvania there is a statutory provision by which claims of title by adverse
possession can be established as a matter of record where the claimant is out of
possession. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 193) tit. 68, §§81-88.
45. See Wilson v. Wilson, 124 Ind. 472, 24 N. E. 974 (I89O); Des Moines &
F. D. Ry. Co. v. Vhitaker, 172 Ia. 394, 400, I54 N. W. 6o4, 606 (I15).
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is effectively removed by cancellation, and one in the form of an oral
assertion, by injunction.46 However, where the title protected is one
founded on adverse possession, a further remedy is required. Under
our system of recording acts, complete marketability and certainty is
achieved only upon the establishment of title as a matter of record. It has
been suggested that to order a conveyance from the former owner would
be a proper method of achieving this result. 7 Such a decree would be
desirable for it would keep the records straight. In any event, there is
valid authority for a decree establishing the title as a matter of record. In
Sharon v. Tucker-48 the plaintiff sought to establish a title acquired by
adverse possession as a matter of record, and to enjoin the making of an
inconsistent claim of title. Speaking for the Court, Mr. Justice Field said:
"No existing rights of the defendants will be impaired by grant-
ing what is prayed, and the rights of the complainants will be placed
in a condition to be available. The same principle which leads a court
of equity upon proper proof to establish by its decree the existence of
a lost deed, and thus make it a matter of record, must justify it upon
like proof to declare by its decree the validity of a title resting in the
recollection of witnesses, and thus make the evidence of the title a
matter of record." 4'
Once it appears on the records-whether by conveyance from the former
owner or by decree of the court-that the adverse possessor has acquired
the title to the premises, and all inconsistent claims have been enjoined or
cancelled as the case may be, complete relief has been afforded. A title,
upon the certainty of which the public can rely, has been achieved.
IV. CONCLUSION
By way of conclusion, it should again be pointed out that jurisdiction
to remove cloud from title was first exercised in this country to protect an
adverse possessor. The few instances of deviation from this initial author-
ity may be explained by a failure of the courts to appreciate the basic
principle involved. The public policy demanding certainty in the title to
land justifies the acquisition of a title by adverse possession. The same
public policy should justify extending to the adverse possessor the privilege
of making that title marketable by striking down all claims that are clouds
upon it. W.V.H.
Surrender by Operation of Law and the Rule of Auer v. Penn
When a tenant abandons leased premises before the end of his term
and notifies his landlord of his intention to make a surrender of the lease,
it is important for the landlord to know the extent of his rights and duties.
He will wish to know whether, and under what conditions, he may re-
enter and relet the premises without discharging his first tenant from the
obligation to pay rent; or whether he is under a duty to relet in order to
minimize the damages for which the first tenant will be liable. As some
46. See Howard, Bills to Rewwve Cloud from Title (i918) 25 W. VA. L. REv.
109, 125.
47. Id. at 126.
48. 144 U. S. 533 (892).
49. Id. at 548.
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courts have held that reentry and reletting by the landlord constitute a
surrender by operation of law and others have held to the contrary, it
becomes important to determine the principles underlying the problem.
Under the Statute of Frauds, all surrenders must be in writing "or by
act and operation of law".- It seems probable that the draftsmen of the
Statute meant a type of surrender known by that name at the time the
Statute was passed when they referred to surrender by operation of law,
and it has been said that the only proper example of such surrender is where
a landlord gives his tenant a new lease, which is inconsistent with a valid
lease already existing between the parties.2 This fact situation could
logically have been placed in a different class from "express" surrender,
because the surrender was thought to take place, not from the intent of
the parties, but from the force which the law gave the new lease. Further-
more, due to the notoriety and the unequivocal nature of the parties' acts,
there was little, if any, danger that fraud would be practiced.3
In the leading case of Lyon v. Reed,4 Baron Parke declared in a
dictum that surrender by operation of law does not result from the intent
of the parties, but that it results even in spite of their intentions.5 Although
this is true in a sense, since surrender traditionally results from the acts
of the parties rather than from their actual intentions, it is a misleading
statement. For the law presumes an intent of the parties to effect a sur-
render in certain situations, because no other reasonable inference can be
drawn from their acts. Thus, in fact, intent is the basis of the surrender.
Baron Parke's dictum has been frequently criticized,6 and today most
courts merely* give effect to the intent of the parties when they feel that
the non-verbal evidence of intent on the part of the landlord to accppt a
proffered surrender is sufficiently unequivocal.
7
Thus where the tenant peaceably surrenders possession to the land-
lord who has entered into a lease with a third person inconsistent with the
first lease, there is held to be a surrender by operation of law." Although
the second lease may be technically invalid, since the landlord has not the
power to convey an interest in the land which already belongs to the first
tenant, his act of offering the second lease, coupled with the tenant's peace-
i. (1676) 29 CAR II ch. 3 §3.
2. Magennis v. MacCullogh, Gilb. Rep. 236, 25 Eng. Rep. R. 163 (1716-1727);
ROBEaRTS, THE STA'rTUT OF FRAUDS (3d Am. ed. 1833) 253, 254; Schnebly, Operative
Facts in Surrenders (927) 22 ILL. L. REV. 22, 25 and the authorities there cited. That
the giving of a new lease inconsistent with a lease already existing between the par-
ties effects a surrender was first decided in Ive's Case, Cro. Eliz. 521, 78 Eng. Rep.
R. 770 (598). See 7 HoLDSWORTa, HISTORY OF ENGisH LAw (2d ed. 1937) 294;
Flagg v. Dow, go Mass. 18 (1868) ; Coe v. Hobby, 72 N. Y. 141 (878).
3. "Proof of words in such cases would be superfluous." Updegraff, The Ele-
ment of Intent in Surrender by Operation of Law, (0924) 28 HARv. L. Rxv. 64, 67.
4. 13 M. & W. 285, 153 Eng. Rep. R. 118 (1844).
5. Lyon v. Reed, 13 M. & W. 285, 3o6, 153 Eng. kep. R. 118, 127 (1844). ".
all the old cases will be found to depend on the principle to which we have adverted,
namely, an act done by or to the owner of a particular estate, the validity of which
he is estopped from disputing, . . . The law there says, that the act itself amounts
to a surrender. In such case it will be observed that there can be no question of
intention."
6. It has been described as "a monstrous anachronism." Updegraff, note 3 supra,
at 86. See also Schnebly, Operative Facts in Surrenders (1927) 22 IL. L. REV. 22;
Note (1917) 15 MicH. L. REV. 659.
7. But see Brown v. Cairns, 107 Iowa 727, 77 N. W. 478 (1898); Felker v.
Richardson, 67 N. H. 509, 32 Atl. 83o (1893) ; 4 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERT'Y (3d ed.
1939) § 962.
8. Amory v. Kannoffsky, 17 Mass. 351 (1875) ; Commercial Hotel Co. v. Brill,
123 Wis. 638, ioi N. W. Iioi (19o5) ; WAREN, CASES ON PROPERTY (2d ed. 1938)
859; (193o) 24 ILL L. REv. 928, 929.
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ful surrender of the premises, shows almost irrebuttably an intent of both
parties to end the first lease. Although this situation may not have given
rise to a surrender by operation of law at the time the Statute of Frauds
was passed, the courts have given it that name in order to avoid the re-
quirements of the Statute. This seems to be a desirable result, as the
Statute was not aimed at such a situation. The courts of equity invented
the doctrine of part performance to accomplish a similar result. Where the
acts of the parties to an alleged oral contract for the sale of land so clearly
indicates the existence of an agreement that it is thought unjust or unneces-
sary to apply the Statute, equity relieves the vendee from the necessity of
producing the contract in writing which the statute requires. 0 So, the
framers of the Statute, by excepting surrender by operation of law from
its scope, and the courts, by expanding the definition of such surrenders,"
have mitigated the harshness of requiring a writing where they regard the
equities of the cases as warranting it.'
2
The question now arises whether, when the tenant abandons the
leased premises and the landlord relets to a new tenant, these acts point
so unequivocally to an intent on the landlord's part to accept the proffered
surrender that it is unnecessary to invoke the Statute of Frauds. Ordinarily
the tenant, on abandoning the land, offers to make a surrender of the lease.
If the landlord does not reply to this offer and proceeds to relet the prem-
ises, the cases go both ways as to whether there has been a surrender by
operation of law. Some cases hold that the second lease is so inconsistent
with the continued existence of the first one that the first must be considered
to have been surrendered by operation of law. The California court takes
this point of view, saying in the case of Welcome v. Hess ': "The tenant,
subject to the covenants of his lease, is the owner of the term. . . . If
he bring ejectment against the n~w tenant, what defense can the new
tenant have,--except that the plaintiff's right has ceased? How has it
ended, unless by surrender?" ' 4 This language indicates that the California
court would find a surrender in any case where the landlord has not been
given authority by the lease or by the tenant to make a new lease for the
tenant's benefit. 5
The opposite view would hold that the tenant remains liable for all
the original rent. However, there is no authority in the cases for such
an extreme view, and all the courts which decide that no surrender has
occurred hold the first tenant liable only for contract damages, namely, the
difference between the rent due under the old lease and the amount ob-
tained from the substituted tenant. One group of cases adopting this
position holds that the landlord is under no duty to protest against the
tenant's wrongful abandonment and may relet without notifying the tenant
9. Of course, if the lease to the second tenant is oral, the non-verbal evidence
points as strongly to an assignment as to a surrender.
i0. WALsH, EQUITY (i93o) 395 et seq.
ii. See note 2 supra.
12. For example, in Ashkenazy v. O'Neill, 267 Mass. i43, 166 N. E. 622 (1929),
(1930) 24 "L. L. REV. 928, L leased an apartment to T on the third floor. The lease
stated that it contained four rooms. On discovery that it only contained three rooms,
the parties made an oral agreement whereby T was to take a four-room apartment
on the second floor. On suit by L for rent under the original lease it was held that
it had been surrendered. The non-verbal evidence in the case pointed so strongly
to a surrender that the court took it out of the Statute.
13. 9o Cal. 507, 27 Pac. 369 (i8gi).
14. Welcome v. Hess, go Cal. 507, 513, 27 Pac. 369, 37, (189i).
i5. To the same effect, see Rice v. Dudley, 65 Ala. 68 (i88o); Paxton Realty
Corp. v. Peaker, 212 Ind. 480, 9 N. E. (2d) 96 (I937); Ladd v. Smith, 6 Ore. 316
(1877) ; Pelton v. Place, 71 Vt. 430, 46 Atl. 63 (1899).
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of his intention to do so or informing him that he will not accept sur-
render.:6
A variation of this view requires the landlord to inform the tenant
that he will not accept the proffered surrender. If he does this, it has been
held that no surrender takes place on the reletting of the premises. Thus
in the Pennsylvania case of Auer v. Penn,"7 Auer was guarantor for Penn's
tenant. When the tenant notified Penn that he intended to abandon the
premises and offered to surrender his interest, Penn refused the proffered
surrender and told the tenant that he would hold Auer for the rent.
Thereafter, he relet the premises for the remainder of the term to several
different tenants, and sued Auer for the rent due under the old lease re-
duced by the amounts received from the substituted tenants. To Auer's
contention that there had been a surrender by operation of law effected by
the reletting, the court answered: "A surrender of the demised premises
by the tenant during the term, to be effectual, must be accepted by the
lessor. . . . Nor does the renting of the premises to another tenant under
such circumstances raise such presumption, for the reason that it is mani-
festly to the lessee's interest that they be occupied." Is
Still another variation requires the landlord not only to tell the tenant
that he will not accept surrender but also to inform him of his intention to
relet for the tenant's benefit in order to prevent a surrender. Thus, in a
New York case, Underhill v. Collins,' the court found no surrender when
the landlord, in a face to face conversation with the tenant, expressed his
intention to relet for the tenant's benefit and the tenant made no objection.
The tenant's silence was said to vest the landlord with authority to make
a new lease. The courts following this rule in effect require the landlord
to rebut any intent to relieve the first tenant of his obligation and also to
introduce evidence from which the law may imply an agency relationship.
20
In a later case, 2' the New York court, reducing the rule to an absurd fine-
ness, held that when the landlord informed the tenant by mail of his inten-
tion to relet but received no reply, there was no authority to relet, the new
lease constituting a surrender of the original one by operation of law.
i6. "The tenant does not need to be told what his obligation is . . . Therefore
reletting does not establish release of obligation to pay rent, and notice of reletting
is not necessary to prevent surrender." Guy v. Gould, 226 Kan. 25, 26, 266 Pac. 925
(1928). Bumiller v. Walker, 95 Ohio St. 344, 116 N. E. 797 (i917); see Roberts
v. Watson, 196 Iowa 816, 195 N. W. 211 (923); Joslin v. McLean, 99 Mich. 48o
(1894). It should be noted that all the cases cited above refer to a supposed duty
of the landlord to mitigate damages.
i7. 99 Pa. 37o (1882).
i8. Id. at 375. It should be noted that Penn never notified the first tenant of his
intention to relet but merely notified him of his intention to enforce the terms of the
lease. His notice to Auer, the surety, that he would relet for the tenant's benefit
could have had no effect on the tenant's liabiltiy. Accord: Fehringer v. Wagner-
Stockbridge Trading Co., 61 Colo. 359, 157 Pac. 1o7i (1916) ; Hulsey v. Harrington,
57 Ga. App. 479, 195 S. E. 9o (2938); Martin v. Steams, 52 Iowa 345 (879);
Novak v. Fontaine Furniture Co., 84 N. H. 93, 146 AtI. 525 (1929) ; see McGrath
v. Shallett, 114 Conn. 622, 259 Atl. 633 (1932) ; Conover v. Sterling Stores Co., i6
Del. Ch. 26, 12o Atl. 740 (2923) ; Rucker v. Tabor, 127 Ga. 102, 56 S. E. 224 (i9o6) ;
Stein v. Hyman-Lewis Co., 95 Miss. 293, 48 So. 225 (igog) ; Rafferty v. Klein, 256
Pa. 481, ioo Atl. 945 (2917).
19. 232 N. Y. 269, 30 N. E. 576 (2892).
2o. Alsup v. Banks, 68 Miss. 664, 9 So. 895 (i89i) ; Casper Nat. Bank v. Curry,
5, Wyo. 284, 65 P. (2d) ir16 (1937) ; see Kean v. Rogers, 246 Iowa 559, 123 N. W.
754 (igog) ; Childress v. Tyson, 20o Ark. 1129, 143 S. W. (2d) 45 (2940) ; Hays v.
Goldman, 71 Ark. 251, 72 S. W 563 (i9o3).
21. Gray v. Kaufman Dairy & I. C. Co., 162 N. Y. 388, 56 N. E. 9o3 (igoo).
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From a practical point of view, the advantages of permitting the land-
lord to relet, even where the tenant refuses his permission, seem over-
whelming. The landlord can thus protect himself against the possibility
that the original tenant may leave the jurisdiction before an action for
rent accrues against him, by retaining his claim under the old lease as
security. He is also partially protected against the possibility that the
original tenant may be unable to respond in damages. Furthermore, he
can protect the property from the deterioration which is certain to occur
in abandoned premises. The tenant will also benefit from such a rule,
since the damages for which he will be liable will be reduced by the rent
received from a new tenant.22 And if the landlord fears that a new lease
will effect a surrender of the old one, he will seek to rent only at a higher
rate or to a person more likely to be able to pay. Finally, a rule which
makes it profitable for landowners not to leave valuable property unpro-
ductively idle benefits society.
2
In view of these advantages, it is unfortunate that the courts have
found that a reletting after abandonment by the tenant constitutes a sur-
render by operation of law in the absence of notice that the landlord in-
tends to hold him for rent or that he intends to relet for his benefit. Unless
reletting by the landlord is susceptable of but one reasonable explanation,
namely an intent to accept surrender, there is an undesirable violation of
the Statute of Frauds. But the true explanation is in most cases, probably,
that the landlord had no intention of accepting a surrender at all, but was
in fact reletting for the first tenant's benefit. This view has its strongest
support in the extreme unlikelihood that a landlord will intend to make
an outright gift to his defaulting tenant by relieving him of his obligation
to pay rent. Courts which, like the New York courts, invoke an agency
theory to rebut a presumption of surrender where there is in fact no such
relationship, 24 tacitly admit this fact; for fictions are seldom used by
courts except to reach realistic results which they cannot attain through
legalistic reasoning. The courts which rely on the supposed duty of a
landlord to relet in order to mitigate the tenant's damages 25 also rely on
spurious legal reasoning to reach a sound result. The statement that there
is such a duty is always made in dictum, and no cases have held a landlord
to such a duty if he has failed to exercise due care to get a new tenant.
2 6
A more satisfactory basis for holding that no surrender is effected by
a reletting is the theory that although the tenant, by terminating actual
possession, wrongfully destroys the privity of estate between himself and
his landlord, the privity of contract remains unimpaired. 27 Such a separa-
22. Hulsey v. Harrington, 57 Ga. App. 479, 484, 195 S. E. 901, 904 (1938);
Alsup v. Banks, 68 Miss. 664, 668, 9 So. 895 (1891) ; Auer v. Penn, 99 Pa. 370, 375
(1882).
23. McCormick, The Rights of the Landlord upon Abandonment of the Premises
by the Tenant (1925) 23 Mica. L. REv. 211, 212.
24. E. g., Underhill v. Collins, 132 N. Y. 269, 30 N. E. 576 (I892).
25. See cases cited note 16 supra.
26. Milling v. Becker, 96 Pa. 182 (i88o) ; Note (1926) 4o A. L. R. 19o. This
Note refers to a minority view which holds the landlord to a duty to relet to mini-
mize damages, but only if he has retaken possession. See McCormick, The Rights
of the Landlord upon the Abandonnwnt of the Premises by the Tenant (1925) 23
MIca. L. REv. 211, 220.
27. PHILBlCK, PROPERIY (1939) 393, 394; Updegraff, The Element of Intent in
Surrender by Operation of Law (1924) 38 HARv. L. RLv. 64, 8o: "It seems, how-
ever, that the tenancy created by the second lease is no more logically exclusive of
the continued existence of the contractual obligation of the prior one than the reten-
tion of refused goods by a seller is exclusive of his right to recover for a breach of
a contract -of sale." See also (1929) 18 GEo. L. J. 70, 71.
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tion of the privities of contract and estate has always been recognized
where a tenant assigns his term.2 8  It is held that though the tenant has
destroyed his interest in the land, he can not, by his own act, destroy his
contractual obligation to pay rent. There seems to be no sound reason for
not applying the same reasoning to the type of case under discussion.
CONCLUSION
Although Baron Parke's theory that intent has nothing to do with
surrender by operation of law has been justly criticized, the courts
have gone to the other extreme in giving effect to the supposed intent
of the parties where the non-verbal evidence of such intent is at least
equivocal, and where a realistic examination of the facts would show
that there should be a -strong presumption against the landlord's ever
having intended to accept surrender. In some cases this results from the
inability of the courts to conceive of a separation of the privities of con-
tract and estate, while in others the courts' requirement that there be some
evidence from which a fictional agency can be imputed puts the burden
of rebutting acceptance of surrender on the landlord, when in fact the
burden of proving such acceptance should be placed on the tenant.
2 9 If
the courts are going to do away with the requirement that surrenders be
in writing, which they are in fact doing by permitting proof by oral evi-
dence of the intent of the parties, 0 they should not be too ready to pre-
sume that the landlord intended to accept surrender by reletting. If, on
the other hand, the courts decide to apply the Statute of Frauds strictly,3'
they should recognize that the act of reletting by the landlord is capable
of two interpretations and that in order to avoid fraudulent claims a
written release should be required to relieve the tenant from liability under
his lease.
S. P. S., Jr.
28. Wall v. Hinds, 70 Mass. 256 (1855); 3 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY (3d ed.
1939) § 882.
29. Because of the improbability that a landlord would accept such an offer.
30. See PHILRiCK, PROPERTY (1939) 394, where the author predicts that the
probable ultimate result of this tendency will be that express unwritten surrender
will be permitted.
31. It is interesting to note that in all but two or three of the American cases
there is no reference to the Statute of Frauds.
